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Voting behavior in international organizations, most notably in the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA), is often used to infer the similarity of 
foreign policy preferences of member states. Most of these measures ignore, 
however, that particular co-voting patterns may appear simply by chance 
(Häge 2011) and that these patterns of agreement (or the absence thereof) are 
only observable if decisions are reached through roll-call votes. As the relative 
frequency of roll-call votes changes considerably over time in most 
international organizations, currently used similarity and affinity measures 
offer a misleading picture. Based on a complete data set of UNGA resolution 
decisions, we demonstrate how taking different forms of chance agreement and 
the relative prevalence of consensus decisions into account affects conclusions 
about the effect of the similarity of member states’ foreign policy positions on 
foreign aid allocation. 
 
 
Affinity measures based on voting in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) have 
become increasingly popular. Since Gartzke’s (1998) prominent use of such data, almost 100 
articles and papers have relied on voting data in order to construct preference measures for 
states and their governments (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten forthcoming). These affinity 
measures are all predicated on the idea that observing a pair of countries voting frequently in 
unison is the result of preference affinities (see, for instance, Alesina and Dollar 2000).  
In the context of voting in the UNGA, however, such measures are problematic for at 
least three reasons: First, these measures do not take into account the possibility of chance 
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agreement (Häge 2011). Affinity measures indicate high agreement scores simply as a result 
of a high propensity of both dyad members to cast a vote of the same type, even if these 
propensities have little to do with the policy substance of the individual decisions voted upon. 
As a remedy, Häge (2011) proposes to use indices that report agreement over and beyond the 
agreement expected based on certain assumptions about the marginal vote distribution of 
dyad members. 
Second, Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (forthcoming) convincingly show that currently 
used affinity measures cannot address the issue of changing agendas. More specifically, if 
due to a particular conflict, a series of resolutions are voted upon in one year but not in the 
other, the preference configuration related to this conflict will strongly affect affinity 
measures even though the underlying preference similarity of states has not changed. 
According to these authors, a one-dimensional item-response theory (IRT) model with 
bridging observations across sessions formed by resolutions with very similar contents allows 
to circumvent this problem. 
A third issue, however, has so far remained largely unaddressed: the fact that consensus 
voting plays an important role in many international organizations in general and the UNGA 
in particular. In the UNGA, for instance, only a small share of resolutions are actually voted 
upon, while a large majority is adopted without a vote through a consensus decision.
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Existing affinity measures and IRT-models rely exclusively on data about roll-call votes. 
Resolutions adopted without a vote are not reflected in these measures. As the share of 
resolutions adopted without a vote varies over time and also across issue domains 
(Hug 2012), both affinity measures and estimates from IRT-models are affected by ignoring 
these missing ‘votes’. 
In the present paper, we address the issue of consensus decisions and show how it may be 
addressed in the context of studies using affinity scores.
2
 We find that neglecting consensus 
decisions may seriously affect affinity values and inferences based on these measurements. 
More specifically, we replicate the study by Alesina and Dollar (2000) on the political and 
strategic factors explaining the allocation of bilateral aid by specific donors. We find that 
preference similarity as measured on the basis of UNGA votes loses most of its importance in 
explaining aid allocation, once we include information on consensus decisions and account 
for chance agreement. 
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 In this paper, we will treat adoptions without a vote as synonymous with a consensus decision, as does 
much of the literature, see Blake and Lockwood Payton (forthcoming). 
2
 In the conclusion, we offer some thoughts about how this problem might be addressed in the context of 
IRT-models. 
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The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. First, we present a brief overview of 
research using affinity measures based on UNGA voting data. This discussionalso highlights 
how the practice of consensus decision-making might affect the results offered in these 
studies. Then we demonstrate in detail how chance agreement and consensus decisions (and 
their neglect) affect similarity measures. This conceptual discussion is followed by the 
presentation of our data set on UNGA voting, which for the first time comprises information 
about resolutions adopted without a vote. Through a replication of Alesina and Dollar's 
(2000) study, we subsequently show that taking consensus decisions and the possibility of 
chance agreement into account is important for finding any effect of foreign policy 
preferences on aid allocation. Had Alesina and Dollar (2000) used Signorino and Ritter's 
(1999) popular S measure, while ignoring consensus votes, they would have concluded to no 
effect of these preferences. Finally, we conclude with a summary of the argument and study 
and some ideas for further research. 
 
AFFINITY MEASURES AND CONSENSUS DECISIONS 
 
Affinity measures have become very popular in quantitative analyses of various subfields in 
International Relations. For example, Gartzke (1998, 2007) draws heavily on them when 
dealing with explanations of interstate conflict. Alesina and Dollar (2000) have popularized 
these measures for the examination of strategic decisions of aid allocation. In terms of the 
exact measures employed, studies differ considerably: Alesina and Dollar (2000) simply rely 
on the proportion of common votes to identify the degree to which a country is a friend of the 
United States (US) or Japan, while Gartzke (1998, 14) employs Spearman's rho correlation 
coefficient. Signorino and Ritter (1999) propose a more sophisticated measure called S, 
which is currently the standard for measuring state foreign policy preference similarity in 
International Relations research. Häge (2011) criticizes this measure because its scores are 
not adjusted for chance agreement that occurs for reasons other than preference similarity. As 
a solution, he proposes to use chance-corrected agreement indices instead.
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Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (forthcoming) propose another critique to these measures; 
They argue that over time, the similarity measures are heavily influenced by agenda effects. 
If a particular conflict becomes important in a particular year, a series of votes will deal with 
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 See Stokman (1977) and Mokken and Stokman (1985) for similar suggestions in the context of UNGA 
voting. 
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it and thus emphasize a particular type of disagreement. This very same and persistent 
disagreement might not appear in the following year, simply because the conflict has 
subsided and no resolutions address it anymore. Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (forthcoming) 
propose to overcome this problem by using an IRT-model which allows estimating ideal 
points based on observed voting decisions. In order to allow for changing preference 
configurations, the authors estimate ideal points for countries on a yearly basis, but ensure 
that the scales of these ideal points are comparable by using very similar resolutions voted 
upon in several sessions as bridging observations from one session to the next. Consequently, 
changes in the location of ideal points can be considered as changes in preferences, and the 
distances among states give an indication of how close or far apart particular countries are 
from each other.
4 
It is important to note that these bridging observations are only necessary if 
scholars wish to assess changes in similarity over time, as much of the literature does. 
However, this way to proceed is not without criticism, as the pertinence of the bridging 
observations is based on very strong assumptions. In particular, the approach assumes that the 
relevant policy space is one-dimensional and that the scale being estimated is the same from 
one year to the next. In addition, the ways in which ideal points translate into votes for the 
bridging observations are assumed to be the same over time as well. Jessee (2010) and Lewis 
as well as Jeffrey and Tausanovitch (2013) assess some recent studies employing a similar 
strategy in research on the American Congress. They find that the necessary assumptions are 
almost never fulfilled. In contrast, affinity measures can be derived as measures of similarity 
of foreign policy positions in a multi-dimensional space (Signorino and Ritter 1999). 
Importantly, the measures do not require the analyst to specify the number of dimensions in 
advance. Furthermore, the suggested chance-corrections moderate undesirable effects of 
changes in the agenda on dyadic similarity values. Thus, chance-correction addresses one of 
the major criticisms waged against simple dyadic similarity measures without making the 
arguably implausible assumption that a single and temporally stable dimension of 
contestation structures the international system.
5
 
Yet, all of these measurement strategies take the roll-call votes in an assembly, usually the 
UNGA as their basic input. This approach is problematic as a large and variable share of 
UNGA resolutions are adopted without a formal vote.
6
 While the large share of resolutions 
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 For a recent study using this measure, see Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll (forthcoming). 
5
 In selecting one or the other approach to measuring foreign policy similarity, researchers should 
consider to what extent they find this assumption justified.  
6
 For discussions on voting rules in international organizations in general and consensus decision-
making in particular, see Blake and Lockwood Payton (2015). Presumably, the rationale for not taking 
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being adopted without a formal vote is acknowledged in the broader literature on the UNGA, 
its variation over time has been largely ignored. For the purpose of measuring the similarity 
of voting patterns, the existence of this variation over time has important implications. If the 
same share of decisions were always reached through consensus decisions, omitting those 
‘votes’ would still understate the similarity of voting patterns but would not affect the 
comparability of affinity values over time. However, if the share of consensus decisions 
varies, affinity measures that do not take consensus decisions into account cannot reasonably 
be compared over time. Figure 1 depicts the share of roll-call votes on final passage of 
UNGA resolutions in the period between 1945 and 2011. (Hug 2012). It shows that the share 
of roll-call votes has varied between a low of approximately 10 per cent (with the exception 
of 1964) and a high of almost 50 per cent. This implies that focusing only on roll-call votes 
ignores between 50 and 90 per cent of all decisions on UNGA resolutions.
7
  
 
Figure 1: Proportion of roll-call votes on UNGA resolutions over time 
                          
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
consensus votes into account is that they do not provide for variation in voting behaviour, but existing work 
does not explicitly justify or even discuss their exclusion (Gartzke 1998, Alesina and Dollar 2000). We contend 
that consensus votes provide information about states’ agreement and, as outlined in detail further below, that 
disregarding them leads to biased measures. 
7
 Hug (2012) shows that there is considerable variation in the share of decisions adopted without a 
formal vote even in UNGA decisions not related to resolutions. 
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The problem generated by consensus decisions is akin to selection effects in roll-call vote 
analyses in parliaments (Hug 2010). We normally have very little guidance about how 
members of parliament voted in non-recorded votes. However, in the case of decision-making 
bodies of international organizations, the lack of an explicit vote signals consensus among the 
delegates (Blake and Lockwood Payton (forthcoming).
8 
Consensus decisions in the UNGA 
are normally preceded, according to the minutes, by the chairperson asking whether a vote on 
a particular resolution (or any other matter) is necessary. Peterson (2005:3), in his discussion 
of changes in UNGA practices notes that his body “. . . also speeded deliberations on 
particular items through a set of unwritten practices for circulating drafts, presenting 
amendments or rival proposals, and developing a single draft through informal consultations 
held outside the public meetings.” Thus, he argues that by informal practices outside the 
regular sessions of the UNGA a consensus is forged, implying that consensus actions are 
most likely akin to unanimous votes in favour. 
A possible criticism of our approach is that consensus decisions might simply relate to 
less consequential resolutions. One way to assess this claim is to consider a commonly used 
source to identify salient UNGA decisions. Since the 1980s, the US State Department is 
required by law to offer a report on “Voting Practices in the United Nations,” in which it 
highlights the most notable decisions and the way UNGA members voted compared to the 
US. In the 1980s, the State Department chose for each session of the UNGA ten roll-call 
votes, most of which are final passage votes of resolutions, that it deemed to be “key.”9 
However, 1988 was the first year in which the State Department designated three decisions 
which were reached without a vote as equally significant. The fact that these resolutions are 
not innocuous is illustrated by the topic covered in the first consensus decision designated by 
the US State Department as being important, resolution 43/20 entitled “The situation in 
Afghanistan and its implication for international peace and security.” This resolution 
addressed concerns by UNGA members about the deteriorating situation in this war-torn 
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 For some contested votes up to 1988, the UNGA’s minutes only report the marginal vote distribution 
rather than a full roll-call. We refer to those votes as ‘non-recorded’, as does the United Nations, to distinguish 
them from consensus decisions and roll-call votes. For the replication analyses reported in the main text, we 
omitted resolutions adopted through non-recorded votes. However, in the web appendix, we report the results of 
replication analyses based on the averages of five imputed datasets (as suggested by King, Honaker, Joseph and 
Scheve 2001). More specifically, based on the reported marginal vote distributions, we randomly assigned yes- 
and no-votes as well as abstentions to the participating countries for all resolutions adopted through non-
recorded votes. The similarity measures were then calculated from the imputed data sets. The results show that 
these imputations barely affect our substantive conclusions, largely because the number of such non-recorded 
votes has declined dramatically during the time period we cover. The number of non-recorded votes are as 
follows (years not listed after 1970 had no such votes): 64 (1970), 49 (1971), 40 (1972), 33 (1973), 36 (1974), 
31 (1975), 7  (1976), 9 (1977), 1 (1978), 2 (1979), 17 (1980), 13 (1981), 2  (1982),  2 (1984), and 1 (1988). 
9
 For a list, see the appendix in Thacker (1999). 
7 
 
country (see also Thacker 1999:73). Since then, the reports by the State Department list both 
important votes and important “consensus actions.” In Figure 2 we depict the number and 
share of these votes and consensus actions from 1983 to 2012.  
Figure 2: Number and share of important resolutions in the UNGA over time 
 
As the left panel of Figure 2 clearly shows, for large periods of time the US State Department 
considered more consenus decisions as important than matters adopted in a roll-call vote. In 
addition, the number of important votes and consensus actions do not evolve in parallel, 
suggesting again, that variation across time is crucial and needs to be taken into account when 
assessing whether pairs of countries display similar preferences. When considering the share 
of roll-call votes and consensus decisions deemed important by the US State Department in 
the right panel of Figure 2, we note that the former share is always larger than the latter. 
However, the share of consensus votes is still of considerable size. In addition, the shares do 
not evolve in parallel over time. Thus, while consensus votes might be on average somewhat 
less important, the figure also shows that they are far from negligible.  
 
ACCOUNTING FOR CONSENSUS DECISIONS IN AFFINITY MEASURES 
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Having introduced the problem caused by consensus decisions and demonstrated their 
prevalence in the UNGA, we now turn to a more detailed discussion about why consensus 
votes generate biases in affinity measures. For the purpose of this analysis, we take consensus 
votes at their face value and treat them as if all members of the UNGA explicitly voted 
‘yea.’10 Even if a formal vote was not taken, consensus implies unanimous agreement and 
member states are on the record for having supported the decision.
11
 A number of reasons 
come to mind why the apparent support for a decision through a consensus vote might not be 
a ‘true’ reflection of the actual position of a member state: a member state might have given 
in to peer pressure, it might be responding to threats and promises of a more powerful state, it 
might be engaged in a log-roll of votes across resolutions, or it might simply try to avoid 
being seen as having lost out in the negotiations for domestic reasons. In principle, the 
aforementioned reasons why consensus votes might not reflect the ‘true’ position of a 
member state apply to more explicit ‘yea’ votes as well.12 Thus, if we treat explicit ‘yea’ 
votes as being indicative of policy positions, little reason exists to treat implicit ‘yea’ votes 
differently. In this respect, treating all consensus votes as ‘yea’ votes is not an arbitrary 
auxiliary assumption, but follows directly from the general logic of roll-call vote analysis that 
suggests that votes constitute revealed preferences of actors.
13
 In the remainder of this 
section, we further elaborate on how the neglect of consensus votes in the calculation of vote 
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 The affinity measures are not affected by the way consensus votes are coded, as long as they are coded 
in the same way for all member states. Assuming that a consensus vote indicates either abstentions by all states 
or no-votes by all states would lead to the same affinity score as assuming that it indicates yes-votes by all 
states. However, the assumption that it signifies yes votes makes more substantive sense. 
11
 Indeed, in some international organisations where consensus voting is common, the respective 
decisions are explicitly recorded as having been adopted by ‘unanimity’, see for example the Council of the 
European Union (Häge 2013). In fact, an important reason for consensus decisions not being adopted through a 
roll call might be the actual absence of opposition to a motion. If it is clear from the outset that all states agree to 
a motion, taking a roll call is redundant. 
12
 We acknowledge that, empirically, the incidence of extraneous factors being responsible for a ‘yea’ 
vote might by higher in the case of consensus than recorded votes. However, the distinction between consensus 
and recorded votes in this respect is a matter of degree, not a qualitative one. An important rationale for 
applying a chance-correction is its adjustment of similarity scores for the possibility that co-voting is not purely 
a result of similar policy positions. But again, although this correction might be somewhat more important when 
including consensus votes in the analysis, the same considerations apply equally when only roll-call votes are 
considered. Indeed, earlier proposals for applying chance-corrections to similarity indices were made in the 
context of analyses of roll-call votes only, see Mokken and Stokman (1985). 
13
 One of the anonymous reviewers suggested that our proposal replaces the empirically untestable 
assumption that roll call votes are representative of consensus votes with the equally untestable assumption that 
all states voted in favour when a resolution was adopted through a consensus vote. In our view, we are merely 
extending an already existing assumption made in analyses of recorded votes to consensus votes. In any case, 
our approach provides at least an alternative way of measuring preference similarity that broadens the 
methodological choice set for researchers. Where no state objected to the adoption of a resolution and is on 
public record for not doing so, it seems more plausible to us to assume that everybody was in favour of the 
resolution than to assume that 20, 30, or maybe even 40 percent of the states privately opposed the resolution 
but did prefer to not voice their dissent publicly (which is implied by the assumption that roll call votes are 
representative of consensus votes).  
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agreement indices is justified neither on conceptual nor methodological grounds. We also 
illustrate how the neglect of consensus votes leads to generally biased agreement values as 
well as problems regarding their comparability over time. 
 
THE EFFECT OF IGNORING CONSENSUS VOTES ON VOTE AGREEMENT MEASURES 
 
A core component of most agreement measures is the proportion of disagreement. Of course, 
the proportion of disagreement is just the converse of the proportion of agreement. In fact, the 
latter is directly used to gauge interest similarity by Alesina and Dollar (2000).
14
 The 
proportion of disagreement also lies at the heart of Ritter and Signorino’s (1999) S, which is 
currently the standard measure used in the international relations literature to assess the 
similarity of states’ UNGA voting profiles. In the case of a nominal variable, the proportion 
of disagreement is simply the sum of the proportion of observations falling in the off-
diagonal cells of the contingency table of the UNGA voting variables of the two states. For i,j 
= 1, ..., k nominal categories and  indicating the proportion of observations falling 
within cell ij of the contingency table, the proportion of disagreement is given by: 
    
 
In the case of ordinal variables, the observations in the off-diagonal cells of the contingency 
table can be weighted to reflect varying degrees of disagreement (Cohen 1968). In the case of 
UNGA voting records, the voting behavior variable of each state can take three values: ‘yea,’ 
‘abstain,’ and ‘nay.’ Although these values reflect categories, most scholars assume them to 
be ordered along the dimension of support for the resolution voted upon (Lijphart 1963:910; 
Gartzke 1998:14-15, but see Voeten 2000:193). Thus, weighting the difference between a 
“yes” and a “no” vote heavier in the calculation of the proportion of disagreement than the 
difference between one of the extreme categories (yea or nay) and the middle category 
(abstention) seems justified. Table 1 illustrates this approach with a particular weighting 
function that assigns weights wij to cells according to the absolute difference between the row 
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 Agreement measures can either be formulated in terms of the proportion of agreement p
A
 or the 
proportion of disagreement p
D
, where . The choice of formulation is arbitrary. We focus on the 
proportion of disagreement as it is equivalent to the ‘sum of distances’-measures used to measure agreement in 
the case of interval-level variables.  
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and column index number ( ). This weighting is equivalent to treating the voting 
variables as exhibiting interval-level scales and calculating the absolute distance between the 
dyad members’ variable values. The latter approach is taken in the calculation of 
disagreement values for S. We prefer the formulation in terms of disagreement weights, as it 
highlights that the precise degree to which different categories indicate disagreement is not 
given ‘naturally’ by the values used to code those categories, but needs to be the subject of a 
conscious decision by the researcher.
15
 Taking weights for different degrees of disagreement 
into account and normalizing the sum of the weighted proportions by the maximum weight 
wmax, the proportion of disagreement for ordered categories is given by the following formula: 
 
   
 
The weights for the individual cells, given our particular weighting function, are shown in 
Table 1. For example, the weight for the ‘State A: nay, State B: abstain’ cell (i = 1, j = 2) is 
calculated by subtracting its column index number from its row index number and taking the 
absolute value of the resulting difference: . The maximum weight 
is calculated by subtracting the highest row (column) index number from the smallest column 
(row) index number and taking the absolute difference. In our case, the index can take values 
from 1 to 3, hence . 
 
Table 1: Calculation of proportion of disagreement for ordinal variables 
   State B   
  1 (Nay) 2 (Abstain) 3 (Yea)  
 
1 (Nay) 
p11 
w11 = 0 
p12 
w12 = 1 
p13 
w13 = 2 
p1·  
State A 2 (Abstain) 
p21 
w21 = 1 
p22 
w22 = 0 
p23 
w23 = 1 
p2· 
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 For example, another prominent weighting function for ordered categorical data assigns weights to 
cells according to the squared distance between the row and column index number, that is 
(Krippendorff 1970). Applying this weighting function is equivalent to calculating the squared 
distance between dyad members’ variable values on interval-level scales. However, as no compelling reason 
exists to weight the difference between the two extreme categories four times heavier than the difference 
between the middle category and one of the extreme categories, we do not consider this weighting function in 
our analyses.  
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3 (Yea) 
p31 
w31 = 2 
p32 
w32 = 1 
p33 
w33 = 0 
p3· 
  p·1 p·2 p·3 1 
 
 
Table 2 shows how the UNGA voting information for the calculation of agreement values is 
usually represented in matrix format. Dyadic agreement values are calculated for each year 
based on the observed voting behavior of states on resolutions adopted during that time 
period.
16
 The table presents data for two years, with ten resolutions adopted in each of them, 
and information about the voting behavior of five major powers. While the table consists of 
artificial data constructed to illustrate our point about the detrimental effects of neglecting 
consensual decisions, the states and their values on the voting variables were chosen to 
roughly mirror the expected voting behavior of the five permanent UN Security Council 
members during the Cold War. During that period of time, the USA had diametrically 
opposed interests to the USSR, the UK and France were more closely aligned with the US, 
and China had more interests in common with the USSR.
17
 The rows of the table with a grey 
background indicate resolutions adopted by consensus. Existing measures of vote agreement 
ignore these types of resolutions.  
The arbitrariness of the neglect of consensus votes is best illustrated by considering the 
voting variable values of the USA and the USSR in year 1. Recall that the proportion of 
disagreement captures the degree to which dyad members’ voting decisions differ from each 
other. The calculation of the proportion of disagreement relies exclusively on information 
about the voting behavior of the two states that are members of the particular dyad. In our 
example, only the information provided in the columns for the USA and USSR of Table 2 is 
of relevance for calculating the dyadic, year-specific vote agreement value for these two 
countries (as highlighted by the heavy-bordered rectangle). As the voting behavior of third 
parties is irrelevant for the calculation of the proportion of disagreement, no compelling 
reason exists to exclude resolutions on which both the US and the USSR voted in favor, just 
because all other states voted in favor as well. Consider the first four resolutions of year 1. In 
all four cases, both the USA and the USSR voted in favor of the resolution. Yet, when 
consensual decisions are excluded from the dataset, the voting behavior on the first two 
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 UNGA sessions and years do not completely overlap. As the temporal scope of the units of analysis 
usually used in international relations research is the year or a multiple thereof, we calculate agreement scores 
for individual years rather than UNGA sessions. In the calculation of dyadic similarity scores, a particular 
resolution is only included if both states were present during the meeting in which the resolution was adopted.  
17
 The extent to which the artificial data in Table 1 do indeed reflect the actual voting behavior of those 
states during the Cold War is incidental to the argument we make here.  
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resolutions is discarded. From a measurement point of view, given how the proportion of 
disagreement is defined, the voting behavior on the first two resolutions provide exactly the 
same information for the calculation of the proportion of disagreement between the US and 
the USSR than the third and fourth resolution. 
 
Table 2: The structure of UN General Assembly voting data 
         Year Resolution  USA USSR  UK France China 
1 1  3 3  3 3 3 
1 2  3 3  3 3 3 
1 3  3 3  3 2 1 
1 4  3 3  2 2 1 
1 5  3 1  3 3 1 
1 6  3 1  3 3 1 
1 7  3 2  3 2 2 
1 8  2 1  2 3 1 
1 9  2 2  3 3 2 
1 10  1 3  2 2 2 
2 1  3 3  3 3 3 
2 2  3 3  3 3 3 
2 3  3 3  3 3 3 
2 4  3 3  3 3 3 
2 5  3 1  3 3 1 
2 6  3 1  3 3 1 
2 7  3 2  3 2 2 
2 8  2 1  2 3 1 
2 9  2 2  3 3 2 
2 10  1 3  2 2 2 
         
Notes: The table presents artificial data constructed by the authors to resemble an extract from the UN General 
Assembly voting data for the five permanent UN Security Council members during the Cold War. The table 
includes data for two years with ten resolutions adopted in each of them. The numerical codes of the voting 
variables indicate 1 = Nay, 2 = Abstain, and 3 = Yea. The rows with a grey background indicate resolutions that 
have been adopted by consensus. The thick-lined rectangle indicates the voting information for the USA-USSR 
dyad. The illustration in the text of the calculation of various agreement measures focuses on this dyad. 
 
Ignoring resolutions adopted by consensus has non-trivial consequences for the agreement 
scores; First, given the large number of consensual decisions during a certain year, the 
agreement scores are generally biased downwards. Second, and possibly more important, 
agreement scores differ over time simply as a result of the proportion of consensual decisions 
changing from year to year. Thus, discerning whether changes in dyadic agreement scores 
over time are really due to changes in the underlying voting profiles of states rather than 
changes in the proportion of consensual decisions becomes impossible. Table 3 illustrates 
these problems with our example data from Table 2. Each contingency table demonstrates the 
13 
 
calculation of the proportion of disagreement between the USA and the USSR. The left 
column of the contingency tables is based on the voting behavior in year 1 and the right 
column of the contingency tables on the voting behavior in year 2. The first row of the 
contingency tables shows the situation in which consensual decisions are included in the 
calculation of the proportion of dissimilarity, while the second row illustrates the situation in 
which they are excluded from the sample. To identify the effect of ignoring consensual 
decisions, the voting profile of each dyad member was constructed to be exactly the same in 
both sessions. The two sessions only vary in the number of consensual decisions taken, which 
is a result of the way third states voted. In year 1, two out of ten decisions (20 per cent) were 
taken by consensus. In contrast, in year 2, four out of ten decisions (40 per cent) were taken 
by consensus. As Figure 1 indicates, these are rather conservative numbers given the often 
much higher consensus rates and fluctuations over time found in the real world.  
Given that the voting profiles of the two states do not change from one session to the 
other, we would expect the proportion of disagreement to be the same as well. Indeed, when 
consensual decisions are taken into account in its calculation, the contingency tables for the 
two sessions are identical, and so are the associated values for the proportion of 
disagreement. When consensual decisions are ignored, the situation looks very different; The 
overall number of resolutions in each session is obviously reduced. Even though only the 
frequency of observations in the ‘3, 3’ cell changes, the proportions for all cells increase as a 
result of the reduced number of resolutions. Given that only the off-diagonal cells indicating 
disagreement receive non-zero weights in the calculation of the proportion of disagreement, 
the proportion of disagreement is generally larger when consensus votes are ignored than 
when they are included. In other words, if consensual decisions are ignored, measures based 
on the proportion of disagreement, including Ritter and Signorino’s S, systematically 
understate vote agreement.  
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Table 3: Consequences of excluding consensual decisions 
  Year 1    Year 2  
            
    A. Consensual decisions included    
            
   USA      USA   
  1 2 3 Total   1 2 3 Total 
 
1 
0 
(.00) 
0 
1 
(.10) 
1 
2 
(.20) 
2 
3 
(.30) 
 
1 
0 
(.00) 
0 
1 
(.10) 
1 
2 
(.20) 
2 
3 
(.30) 
USSR 2 
0 
(.00) 
1 
1 
(.10) 
0 
1 
(.10) 
1 
2 
(.20) USSR 2 
0 
(.00) 
1 
1 
(.10) 
0 
1 
(.10) 
1 
2 
(.20) 
 
3 
1 
(.10) 
2 
0 
(.00) 
1 
4 
(.40) 
0 
5 
(.50) 
 
3 
1 
(.10) 
2 
0 
(0) 
1 
4 
(.40) 
0 
5 
(.50) 
 Total 1 
(.10) 
2 
(.20) 
7 
(.70) 
10 
(1) 
 Total 1 
(.10) 
2 
(.20) 
7 
(.70) 
10 
(1) 
            
 
 0.4 
 
 0.4 
            
    B. Consensual decisions excluded    
            
   USA      USA   
  1 2 3 Total   1 2 3 Total 
 
1 
0 
(.00) 
0 
1 
(.125) 
1 
2 
(.25) 
2 
3 
(.375
) 
 
1 
0 
(.00) 
0 
1 
(.17) 
1 
2 
(.33) 
2 
3 
(.50) 
USSR 2 
0 
(.00) 
1 
1 
(.125) 
0 
1 
(.125) 
1 
2 
(.25) USSR 2 
0 
(.00) 
1 
1 
(.17) 
0 
1 
(.17) 
1 
2 
(.33) 
 
3 
1 
(.125) 
2 
0 
(.00) 
1 
2 
(.25) 
0 
3 
(.375
) 
 
3 
1 
(.17) 
2 
0 
(.00) 
1 
0 
(.00) 
0 
1 
(.17) 
 Total 1 
(.125) 
2 
(.25) 
5 
(.625) 
8 
(1) 
 Total 1 
(.17) 
2 
(.33) 
3 
(.50) 
6 
(1) 
            
 
 0.5 
 
 0.67 
Notes: The tables are based on the artificial data presented in Table 2. The rows and columns of each table 
indicate the absolute and relative number of different types of votes (1 = ‘nay’, 2 = ‘abstain’, 3 = ‘yea’). The 
first figure of each cell gives the absolute number, the second figure in parentheses gives the proportion, and the 
third number gives the disagreement weight. The overall proportion of disagreement in voting can then be 
computed as the weighted sum of proportions divided by the maximum weight. For example, the proportion of 
disagreement for year 1 when consensual decisions are included in the calculation is computed by multiplying 
the third number with the second number in each cell of the table and adding up the resulting products. The sum 
of products is then divided by the maximum disagreement weight of 2: 
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In this particular example, the proportion of disagreement is 0.40 in both years when 
consensual decisions are included.
18
 In contrast, the proportion of disagreement is 0.50 in 
year 1 and 0.67 in year 2 when consensual decisions are excluded. The generally higher 
proportions of disagreement when consensual decisions are ignored illustrate the bias 
generated by their exclusion. The difference in the proportion of disagreement between 0.50 
in year 1 and 0.67 in year 2 also shows how the proportion of disagreement varies simply as a 
result of different consensus rates. The two sessions indicate different proportion of 
disagreement scores even though the voting profiles of the two states are exactly the same. 
This finding highlights the more severe problem resulting from the exclusion of consensual 
decisions: proportions of disagreement scores are generally not comparable across time as the 
size of the measurement bias varies with the size of the consensus rate. The larger the 
consensus rate of a particular session, the more agreement scores are biased towards more 
disagreement.
19
  
 
CORRECTING VOTE AGREEMENT FOR CHANCE 
 
In its raw form, the proportion of disagreement will generally be very low if consensual 
decisions are taken into account. When the proportion of disagreement is rescaled to indicate 
agreement, measures relying on this quantity will indicate very high agreement scores. From 
                                                          
18
 See the notes to Table 3 for a detailed example of how the proportion of disagreement is calculated 
from the information in the contingency tables.  
19
 Note that the size of the bias is not constant across dyads within a year. For example, consider a 
proportion of disagreement of 0.5 resulting from contrary voting on 4 out of 8 roll-call votes. Adding two 
consensus votes increases the denominator from 8 to 10, resulting in a proportion of disagreement of 0.4. Now 
consider a proportion of disagreement of 0.25 resulting from contrary voting on 2 out of 8 roll-call votes. 
Adding two consensus votes in this situation results in a proportion of disagreement of 0.2. Thus, whereas the 
bias in the first situation is 0.1, it is 0.05 in the latter. The situation becomes even more complicated when 
chance-corrections are applied, as the resulting similarity values are generally non-linear functions of the 
proportion of disagreement. The differential impact on dyads within the same year implies that the bias resulting 
from ignoring consensus votes cannot be avoided by including control variables, such as time dummies or a 
continuous variable for the number of consensus votes, in statistical analyses. If the number of consensus votes 
was the same for each dyad in each year, including the number of consensus votes in that year plus its 
interaction with the proportion of disagreement could in principle be a technical substitute for including 
consensus votes in the measure itself. However, in practice, the number of consensus votes is not constant for all 
dyad members in a certain year. A dyadic similarity score can only be calculated if both dyad members 
participated in the adoption of a particular resolution. Due to some states only being members during part of a 
year or simply not attending the General Assembly meeting in which a resolution has been adopted, this is not 
always the case. As a result, the number of consensus votes varies from dyad to dyad. In fact, absenteeism is 
quite common in the General Assembly; roughly 89 per cent of all dyad similarity scores are based on a number 
of resolutions that is lower than the total number of resolutions adopted during a particular year because one or 
both dyad members did not attend a the meeting in which a particular resolution was adopted. Furthermore, this 
percentage varies widely over time from 21 per cent in 1955 to 100 per cent in 1985.    
16 
 
a measurement point of view, these high scores are not problematic, as they indicate exactly 
what the data tell us: most of the time, both dyad members support the adoption of a 
resolution. Yet, if we are interested in using vote agreement of states as an indicator for the 
similarity of their foreign policy preferences, we might want to compare the observed 
agreement to the agreement expected simply by chance. Of course, we are not suggesting that 
voting occurs randomly in real-life situations. However, the hypothetical scenario of random 
and independent voting provides a yardstick for making a judgment about the extent to which 
the actually observed agreement expresses similar or dissimilar policy positions (Stokman 
1975:84). States with similar policy positions will have a much larger agreement score than 
the score expected by random voting, and states with dissimilar policy positions will have a 
much lower agreement score than the one expected by random voting. In addition, the 
agreement expected by chance is computed based on assumptions about the marginal 
distribution of probabilities with which states vote a certain way. Depending on the nature of 
the assumptions, they can alleviate concerns about agenda-effects and co-voting occurring 
due to factors other than preference similarity. In general, any chance-corrected agreement 
index A takes the following form: 
 
    
 
The observed proportion of disagreement Do is divided by the proportion of disagreement 
expected by chance De. The ratio is then subtracted from 1 to rescale the value to indicate the 
degree of agreement rather than disagreement. A value of 1 indicates perfect agreement, 
values between 0 and 1 indicate more agreement than expected by chance, a value of 0 
indicates agreement no different from chance, and values below 0 indicate more 
disagreement than expected by chance.  
While the general structure of chance-corrected agreement indices is the same for all, they 
differ in their assumptions about the disagreement expected by chance. Broadly speaking, we 
can first distinguish between data-independent and data-dependent types of chance 
corrections. Within the latter category, we can further subdivide measures by whether they 
rely on information from the entire sample to calculate the chance correction or only from the 
specific dyad. Figure 3 shows the resulting classification tree. 
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Figure 3: Classification of chance-correction approaches 
 
 
Currently, the most prominent agreement index in international relations research is 
Signorino and Ritter’s (1999) S. In its simplest and most widely used form, this index is given 
by , where yl and xl stand for the type of vote countries Y and X cast 
on resolution l, dmax for the theoretically possible maximum distance between y and x values, 
and the summation is over all resolutions l = 1, ..., r. Thus, for each resolution, S first 
calculates the distance between the two countries’ vote variable values and then normalizes 
the observed distance by dividing it by the theoretically possible maximum distance. These 
normalized distance values are then summed up over all resolutions. Translated into our 
notation, the sum of normalized observed distances in S corresponds to the proportion of 
disagreement derived from a contingency table: 
 
 
The reformulation makes it clear that S is simply a linear function of the proportion of 
disagreement Do. The multiplication by 2 ‘stretches’ the disagreement values from its original 
range between 0 and 1 to a range between 0 and 2. The subtraction of the resulting value 
18 
 
from 1 reverses the polarity of the measure and rescales it to a range between -1: complete 
disagreement and 1: complete agreement. The equation for S can be further reformulated to 
bring it completely in line with the format of the general equation for chance-corrected 
agreement indices. Rather than multiplying the observed proportion of disagreement by 2, we 
can equivalently divide it by ½. Thus, when interpreted as a chance-corrected agreement 
index, the expected proportion of disagreement of S is 0.5. In other words, half of the 
theoretically possible maximum proportion of disagreement is expected to occur by chance. 
In general, disagreement expected by chance is given by the following formula for all 
chance-corrected agreement indices: 
 
  
   
 
Different indices vary only in the assumptions they make about the marginals mi· and m·j of 
the vote variables used to calculate the expected disagreement. That is, they differ only in 
their assumptions about states’ propensities to vote a certain way (see Table A12 in web 
appendix for a summary of these assumptions). 
Table 4 illustrates how the disagreement expected by chance varies as a result of different 
assumptions, and how the different chance-corrections then lead to different similarity values. 
In the case of S, the marginals for the calculation of the expected disagreement are not related 
to the observed contingency table. Therefore, S implicitly relies on a data-independent 
chance-correction based on an expected disagreement score of 0.5. An expected disagreement 
by chance of 0.5 can be generated through various combinations of marginal distributions, 
including any that involves one member state having a 0.5 propensity to fall into each of the 
extreme categories (yea or nay) and a 0 propensity to fall into the intermediate category 
(abstain). However, if we assume that both member states have the same propensities to vote 
in a certain way, which implies that their marginal distributions are identical, only the 
situation in which both member states have a 0.5 propensity to vote ‘yea’ and ‘nay’ and a 
zero propensity to abstain produces an expected disagreement of 0.5. The contingency table 
of expected proportions generated by these marginals, together with the relevant 
disagreement weights, is depicted in Panel B of Table 5. 
19 
 
The assumptions about the form of the marginal distributions used to calculate the chance 
correction of S are hard to justify on substantive grounds.
20
 Assuming that states have a 50 
per cent probability of voting ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ and a zero per cent probability of abstaining 
contradicts both common sense and available empirical information.
21
 A somewhat more 
plausible, also data-independent way of correcting for chance is to assume that states have the 
same propensity of 1/3 to vote either ‘yea’, ‘nay’ or abstain (Lijphart 1963:906-8, Mokken 
and Stokman 1985:186-7). Panel C of Table 4 illustrates the case where chance disagreement 
is calculated based on such uniform marginals. Note that the chance disagreement based on 
uniform marginals is smaller than the chance disagreement implicitly assumed by S. Indeed, 
Mokken and Stokman (1985:187) assert that the assumption about the extreme bimodal 
marginal distribution used to calculate the expected disagreement for S yields the 
theoretically possible maximum expected disagreement. This assertion seems to only hold for 
indices that assume symmetrical marginal distributions, which are identical for both states.
22
 
With the exception of Cohen’s κ, all of the indices discussed here make this assumption. 
Just like any data-independent approach to specifying the marginal distributions, the 
choice of uniform values might be criticized for neglecting empirical information about the 
actual voting behavior. As already recognized by Lijphart (1963:906), few resolutions are put 
to a vote in the UNGA that do not pass and abstentions are rarer than either yea or nay votes. 
Thus, rather than equal probabilities, he suggests it is more plausible to assume that the 
probability of voting yea is higher than the probability of voting nay, and that the latter, in 
turn, is higher than the probability of abstaining. Rather than assuming relatively arbitrary 
values for the marginal distributions based on rules of thumb derived from general voting 
patterns in the UNGA, Mokken and Stokman (1985:187) go one step further in suggesting 
that these values could be directly estimated from the information in the sample. They 
propose to estimate the marginals by computing, for each resolution, the proportion of states 
voting in favor, against, and abstaining. Subsequently, the proportions are averaged over all 
resolutions adopted during the particular session or time period. We call this approach 
‘resolution average marginals,’ as proportions of states voting in a certain way on a particular 
                                                          
20
 Mokken and Stokman (1985:187-8) argue that this chance correction is useful for measuring the 
cohesion of a decision-making body as a whole. 
21
 The lack of plausible assumptions about the marginal distributions used in the calculation of chance 
disagreement in S is understandable, given that the correction for chance disagreement was not an explicit goal 
in the development of this measure. 
22
 It is easy to construct an example of a contingency table with asymmetric marginal distributions that 
yields a higher expected proportion of disagreement value than 0.5. 
20 
 
resolution are averaged over all resolutions to estimate the marginals (see Panel D in 
Table 5).  
The ‘country average marginals’ approach is similar, but here the vote proportions are 
first calculated for individual states across all resolutions and then averaged over all states. 
When there are no missing values in the voting matrix, as in the toy example of Table 5, the 
two approaches yield identical results. However, in real-world UNGA voting, the voting 
matrix often has missing values because some member states might not have been members 
of the UN for the entirety of the particular time period for which the agreement index is being 
calculated, or they have not been taking part in one or more of the votes for other unknown 
reasons. In light of the missing values, the sequence in which vote proportions and averages 
are being calculated to estimate the marginal distributions matters. Given the non-uniform 
shape of actually observed marginal distributions, these empirically informed chance-
correction approaches are certainly an improvement over data-independent approaches, 
especially when a large number of consensus votes are part of the sample.  
The chance-corrected approaches provide measures of dyadic agreement over and above 
the agreement expected for a dyad with average sample marginal. In the face of many 
consensus votes, expected agreement will be higher, lowering the value of the similarity 
variable. If we have reasons to believe that consensus votes are somewhat less indicative of 
‘true’ agreement than recorded yea votes, this effect is certainly desirable. Also, changes in 
the average marginal distributions over time are likely to be mostly the result of agenda 
effects. When more resolutions with ‘agreeable’ content are being tabled in a certain year, the 
rate of consensus decisions will be generally higher compared to the situation where mostly 
resolutions with controversial content are being tabled in a certain year, even if the 
underlying policy positions of states have remained constant. Putting the observed agreement 
into relation to the agreement expected based on average marginals adjusts the similarity 
values for those types of agenda effects.   
21 
 
Table 4: Calculation of indices based on different assumptions about marginals 
A. Observed disagreement  B. Signorino and Ritter’s S  
   USA       USA    
  1 2 3     1 2 3   
 1 0.00 
0 
0.10 
1 
0.20 
2 
0.30   1 0.25 
0 
0.00 
1 
0.25 
2 
0.50  
USSR 2 0.00 
1 
0.10 
0 
0.10 
1 
0.20  USSR 2 0.00 
1 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
1 
0.00  
 3 0.10 
2 
0.00 
1 
0.40 
0 
0.50   3 0.25 
2 
0.00 
1 
0.25 
0 
0.50  
  0.10 0.20 0.70 1    0.50 0.00 0.50 1  
              
  
 
  
 
       
  
 
C. Uniform marginals  D. Country/resolution average marginals  
   USA       USA    
  1 2 3     1 2 3   
 1 0.11 
0 
0.11 
1 
0.11 
2 
0.33   1 0.03 
0 
0.05 
1 
0.10 
2 
0.18  
USSR 2 0.11 
1 
0.11 
0 
0.11 
1 
0.33  USSR 2 0.05 
1 
0.08 
0 
0.15 
1 
0.28  
 3 0.11 
2 
0.11 
1 
0.11 
0 
0.33   3 0.10 
2 
0.15 
1 
0.29 
0 
0.54  
  0.33 0.33 0.33 1    0.18 0.28 0.54 1  
              
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
D. Scott’s τ  E. Cohen’s κ  
   USA       USA    
  1 2 3     1 2 3   
 1 0.04 
0 
0.04 
1 
0.12 
2 
0.20   1 0.03 
0 
0.06 
1 
0.21 
2 
0.30  
USSR 2 0.04 
1 
0.04 
0 
0.12 
1 
0.20  USSR 2 0.02 
1 
0.04 
0 
0.14 
1 
0.20  
 3 0.12 
2 
0.12 
1 
0.36 
0 
0.60   3 0.05 
2 
0.10 
1 
0.35 
0 
0.50  
  0.20 0.20 0.60 1    0.10 0.20 0.70 1  
              
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
However, the effect of changes in extrinsic variables, such as the agenda, on states’ vote 
marginals might not be uniform across all states. Both the voting behavior of particular dyads 
and individual countries within dyads might be unduly affected by changes in those variables 
22 
 
as well. Scott’s (1955) π and Cohen’s (1968) κ address these issues. The country average 
marginals approach is basically an extension of the chance-correction approach used in the 
calculation of Scott’s π. While the country average marginals approach averages the 
propensities of states to vote in a certain way over all states in the sample, Scott’s π only 
averages the vote propensities of the two states that form part of the particular dyad. In this 
respect, Scott’s π is more flexible and able to not only adjust for factors that affect the voting 
behavior of all states in the sample equally, as do consensus votes, but also for factors that 
affect only the voting behavior of the particular dyad members in the same way. For example, 
if over time, more resolutions are put on the agenda about issues on which both dyad 
members generally agree, raw similarity scores increase even if the underlying policy 
preferences remain stable. If this type of agenda effect is relatively unique to particular dyads 
or affects dyads in different ways, chance-corrections based on the marginal distributions of 
the entire sample of dyads cannot alleviate the problem. Only dyad-specific chance-
corrections limit this type of distortion.  
Yet Scott’s π still assumes that both dyad members have identical propensities to vote in a 
certain way, although good reasons exist to expect that certain factors have divergent effects 
on the voting behavior of dyad members. In general, expected agreement based on the 
average dyad marginal will be larger if the marginal distributions are symmetrical rather than 
asymmetrical. In other words, Scott’s π takes a lower value if dyad members differ in their 
propensities to vote in a certain way than if they share the same propensities. At first sight, 
this seems reasonable. Differences in the marginal distributions show up as differences in the 
agreement score.
23
 However, a case can be made that the number of times a state votes in a 
certain way mainly depends on the types of issues decided upon in the time period under 
investigation. For example, during a period where many resolutions on the Middle East 
conflict are being adopted, the United States might vote against France quite a large number 
of times. In other periods, where the Middle East conflict is less salient, the number of 
opposing votes might be much smaller in that dyad even though no change in the underlying 
foreign policy preferences has occurred. In general, the same agenda change might lead to 
more co-voting for some dyads, while resulting in more opposing votes for others. Scott’s π 
only accounts for the first possibility. In contrast, Cohen’s κ allows each dyad member to 
                                                          
23
 Häge (2011:293) makes the case that the assumptions of Scott’s π are more appropriate for measuring 
foreign policy similarity based on UNGA voting data. In terms of the relatively low costs of creating a UNGA 
voting ‘tie’ compared to an alliance tie, this makes sense. However, in the case of UNGA data, the main reason 
why individual states may systematically differ in their propensity to vote in a certain way has less to do with 
differential costs, given that voting is relatively ‘cheap’ regardless of what type of vote is being cast (see Hovet, 
1960), but with the content of the agenda they are asked to vote upon. 
23 
 
have its own independent marginal distribution for the calculation of the proportion of 
expected agreement. The measure directly uses the marginal distributions of the observed 
contingency table to estimate the expected marginal distributions. In comparison to Scott’s π, 
Cohen’s κ results in a lower expected agreement value if marginal distributions are 
asymmetrical, adjusting similarity values upwards. Given that Cohen’s κ is most versatile in 
adjusting for both the inclusion of consensus votes and the potentially divergent effects on 
voting behavior resulting from changes in the agenda and other factors, the following 
replication studies focus on the performance of this chance-corrected agreement index 
compared to the widely used S  proposed by Signorino and Ritter's (1999).
24
 
 
REPLICATION OF ALESINA AND DOLLAR (2000) 
 
In his study on chance-corrected agreement indices, Häge (2011) demonstrates that S and 
chance-corrected agreement indices like Cohen’s κ and Scott’s π are not interchangeable and 
can lead to very different conclusions drawn from statistical analyses. In a replication of 
Gartzke’s (2007) study of the determinants of interstate war onset, he shows that the results 
are only consistent with Gartzke’s theoretical claims once S is replaced by κ or π in the 
regression model. 
Instead of drawing on the same example we turn to another literature in which affinity and 
similarity measures are in frequent use, namely the liteature on foreign aid. In a path breaking 
study, Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that political and strategic reasons explain to a 
significant part aid allocation both generally and by individual countries like the US. In what 
follows. we carry out replications of two models of Alesina and Dollar's (2000) study on total 
bilateral aid and US bilateral aid given to recipient countries in five year periods.
25
 These 
models, apart from economic and social explanatory variables, also comprise political factors 
such as civil liberties and measures of whether a recipient country was a friend of a specific 
donor country. The latter measure is operationalized as the proportion of votes in the UNGA 
in which the two countries were in agreement.
26
 
                                                          
24
 In the web appendix we also report replication results based on the other four similarity measures 
discussed above. 
25
 We obtained the replication data from AidData-website 
(http://aiddata.org/content/index/Research/replication-datasets), and David Dollar provided greatly appreciated 
help in using it. 
26
 Unfortunately, the authors offer almost no explanation of how this measure was constructed. For 
instance, we do not know whether abstentions were counted. We also do not know whether proportions were 
24 
 
For this replication, we rely on the Alesina and Dollar (2000) data and complement it with 
our own similarity measures based on new data of UNGA voting. Most studies rely on 
Voeten’s (2000) UNGA voting data, which relies, in part, on Gartzke’s (1998), Kim and 
Russett’s (1996) and Alker and Russett’s (1965) data (see also Strezhnev & Voeten 2012). 
Unfortunately, combining data from different sources has led to a situation in which the 
inclusion criteria vary across time periods (for example,votes on amendments are included 
until the 1970s, but are no longer included in the data for more recent periods). For this 
reason we rely on Hug’s (2012) data which comprises, based on a common source, all votes 
on resolutions as well as information on all resolutions debated in the UNGA. As we have 
information on both resolutions adopted through roll-call votes and resolutions adopted 
through consensus votes, we proceed as follows: First, we generate for each year a dataset 
that only comprises the member state voting records on resolutions adopted through roll-call 
votes. Second, we generate an imputed dataset where for all states that were members of the 
UN at the time of the vote, we assume that they voted in favour of all resolutions adopted 
without a vote.
27
  
 
As Alesina and Dollar's (2000) study uses five-year periods as the temporal unit of 
analysis, we followed their approach used for all other variables and aggregated our yearly 
similarity measures based on our imputed UNGA voting data by calculating five year 
averages. We then merged our data with Alesina and Dollar's (2000) replication dataset. As a 
first step in the analysis, this allows us to compare our similarity measures with those 
employed in the original study, namely the proportion of common votes between the aid 
recipient and the United States (and other countries). Figures 4 and 5 depict the relationships 
between the proportion of common votes and Signorino and Ritter's (1999) S and Cohen’s κ, 
respectively. The left panel of each figure provides the similarity values based on roll-call 
votes only, while the right panel provides similarity values that also take consensus votes into 
account. 
In Figure 4, where we compare S to the proportion of common votes, we find that in the 
left panel without consensus votes, the two measures are closely related. Given that S is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
calculated over all resolutions adopted throughout the five-year period used as the temporal unit of analysis in 
this study or first for individual years separately and then aggregated over the five-year period. 
27
 Again, it is important to note that we make the assumption, that adoptions without a vote signal 
unanimous support for the resolution in question. As noted in footnote 13, we omit non-recorded votes for 
which only the marginal distribution is recorded. Results based on imputed datasets taking those non-recorded 
votes into account are reported in the web appendix. All the data will be made available on dataverse upon 
publication. 
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linear transformation of the proportion of common votes, this is not surprising. Indeed, any 
deviation from a perfect relationship between the two variables must be due to differences in 
the underlying data. When taking consensus votes into account (right panel in Figure 4), we 
generally find much higher S values, but a much weaker relationship between S and the 
proportion of common votes as well.  
 
 
Figure 4: Ritter and Signorino’s S vs. proportion of common votes 
Notes: The figure plots similarity values averaged over five-year periods for dyads including the US as  
donor country. 
 
In Figure 5, where we rely on Cohen’s κ, already the left panel omitting consensus votes 
shows a rather weak relationship between the values of κ and the proportion of common 
votes. Again, once we include consensus votes, the value of κ generally increases and the 
relationship with Alesina and Dollar's (2000) proportion of common votes becomes 
26 
 
considerably more blurred. Hence, it is likely that the proportion of common votes, by not 
considering consensus votes, is actually measuring something quite distinct from affinity. 
 
Figure 5: Cohen’s κ vs. proportion of common votes 
 
Notes: The figure plots similarity values averaged over five-year periods for dyads including the US as donor 
country. 
 
We assess the effects of these different measurement strategies on the conclusions of Alesina 
and Dollar's (2000) analyses by re-estimating one of their models, focusing on bilateral aid 
obtained from the US (Table 5).
28
 While Alesina and Dollar (2000) make their data available, 
there are very few indications on how this data was used to produce the results reported in 
their paper. Thus, we first report in the first column the results reported in Alesina and 
                                                          
28
 In the web appendix we also report replications of a model by Alesina and Dollar (2000) focusing on 
total bilateral aid. For the model reported in Table 5 we list in the web appendix (Table A11) the list of countries 
covered and the number of cases. 
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Dollar's (2000) article before showing our replication in the other columns. We then replace 
in these models the proportion of common votes between the aid recipient and the US (or 
Japan, respectively) with S and κ. In the first two models, the affinity measures are based 
only on roll-call votes, in the last two models we also include information on consensus votes 
in the calculation of S and κ. 
In Table 5 we report the results of our replication that focuses on explaining US bilateral 
aid.
 
We are unable to reproduce the positive effect of GDP per capita reported by Alesina and 
Dollar (2000).
29
 For the other variables, we are able to approximate the original results, 
except that no former colony of the US has non-missing data on all variables, which is why 
this variable was dropped from our replication. We are only able to partly replicate the 
positive effect of voting with the US on obtaining aid from this country. When we consider S 
and κ as similarity measures while ignoring consensus votes, we obtain contrasting results. 
While for κ we find the positive effect found by Alesina and Dollar (2000), for S the effect is 
negative. Both effects are not statistically significant. When considering consensus votes in 
the calculation of those similarity measures as well, we find two positive coefficients, but 
only the effect of κ remains statistically significant.30 Consequently, if Alesina and Dollar 
(2000) had used the currently predominant measure of preference similarity in their analysis, 
their conclusion would have been that political and strategic explanations are unimportant for 
explaining US bilateral aid. Only when using both consensus votes and a chance correction, 
voting similarity, as measured by κ, appears to significantly affect US bilateral aid.  
                                                          
29
 Given the robustness of the negative effect of this variable in the remaining models in Table 3, we can 
only suspect a typo in Alesina and Dollar's (2000) article. Regarding Alesina and Dollar's (2000) model, one 
might also suspect that changes in the dependent variable over time are not only affected by their independent 
variables, but also by past aid allocations (we thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting us to this point). As the 
goal of our replication analysis is to show the sensitivity of Alesina and Dollar's (2000) results to changes in the 
measures of similarity, it seems inappropriate to change the underlying empirical model. 
30
 When replicating these analyses also taking into account non-recorded votes through imputed data sets, 
we find the same pattern of coefficients when consensus votes are taken into account. When consensus votes are 
neglected, the effect of co-voting with the US is not statistically significant and, in the case of S, reverses its sign 
(see Table A6 in the web appendix). 
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Table 5: Replication of Alesina and Dollar (2000), bilateral aid by US 
(linear regression with White robust standard errors)  
 similarity measure 
 without consensus votes with consensus votes 
 proportion of  chance corrected chance corrected 
 agreement S κ S κ 
 b b b b b b 
 (t) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
Log GDP per capita 1.840* -1.662* -1.768* -1.736* -1.714* -1.689* 
 - (0.153) (0.155) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) 
Economic openness   1.300* 0.818* 1.048* 1.013* 0.964* 0.956* 
  (4.02) (0.284) (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) (0.286) 
democracy 0.570* 0.388* 0.445* 0.420* 0.404* 0.386* 
  (8.07) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) 
Friend of USA (UNGA voting) 0.060* 0.042* -3.102 0.818 1.922 3.659* 
 (3.60) (0.014) (1.996) (1.052) (1.016) (1.406) 
Log years as colony of US 0.39*      
  (1.69)      
Log years as colony not of US 0.08 -0.007 -0.010* -0.009* -0.009* -0.008* 
(1.33) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Egypt  40.090* 4.514* 4.545* 4.554* 4.528* 4.509* 
  (4.14) (0.893) (0.896) (0.899) (0.895) (0.891) 
Israel   5.040* 4.759* 8.065* 6.709* 5.804* 5.484* 
  (3.94) (1.112) (1.002) (1.070) (1.125) (1.070) 
Percent Muslims   0.010* 0.023* 0.025* 0.025* 0.025* 0.025* 
  (1.98) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Percent Catholics 0.010 0.018* 0.023* 0.021* 0.020* 0.020* 
  (1.69) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Percent other religions (Hindu) 0.004 
 
0.011 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.014* 
(0.05) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
1970-1974  9.438* 14.128* 11.927* 11.574* 11.716* 
   (1.327) (1.736) (1.096) (1.110) (1.085) 
1975-1979  9.340* 14.113* 11.850* 11.706* 11.691* 
   (1.339) (1.788) (1.109) (1.106) (1.098) 
1980-1984  11.019* 13.744* 12.176* 12.815* 12.075* 
   (1.152) (1.480) (1.115) (1.152) (1.105) 
1985-1989  11.170* 13.443* 12.037* 12.892* 11.949* 
   (1.121) (1.414) (1.106) (1.184) (1.097) 
1990-1994  10.680* 14.192* 11.853* 12.545* 11.839* 
  (1.152) (1.844) (1.108) (1.154) (1.097) 
N 364 364 358 358 358 358 
R
2
 0.5 0.705 0.704 0.702 0.705 0.708 
Resid. s.d.  1.722 1.728 1.732 1.725 1.717 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, except in the first column where t-values, based on robust 
standard errors, are reported. * indicates significance at p<0.05 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
29 
 
An increasing number of studies dealing with a variety of topics relies on similarity measures 
based on voting records in the UNGA to measure preferences of governments. As several 
studies have shown, the most widely used measures have considerable shortcomings: First, as 
illustrated by Häge (2011), chance agreement is not adjusted for in an explicit and sensible 
way by most commonly used measures. Second, Bailey, Strezhnev & Voeten (forthcoming) 
convincingly highlight that the same measures suffer from agenda effects as resolutions often 
deal with very topical issues on conflict. Finally, we highlighted that neglecting the varying 
share of consensus votes is equally likely to lead to biases in these measures. 
We first demonstrated this problem based on “artificial data,” showing that neglecting 
consensus votes is likely to underestimate affinities among country pairs. Under the 
assumption that resolutions that are adopted without a vote have the tacit support of all 
UNGA members at the time of the vote, we generated a dataset comprising information on all 
resolutions adopted both with and without an explicit vote. Not surprisingly, when compared 
to traditional measures like the proportion of common votes (leaving aside consensus votes), 
measures that also consider consensus votes show higher levels of affinity (and thus also less 
variation). When replicating Alesina and Dollar's (2000) influential study on the political and 
strategic determinants of bilateral aid, we find that many of their main findings are not robust 
to the inclusion of consensus votes. More specifically, their effect of preference similarities 
with the US on US bilateral aid can only be reproduced if consensus votes are integrated and 
a chance-corrected measure like κ is used. In the absence of this we find no effect of 
preference similarity on US bilateral aid. Conversely, using this same measure with 
consensus votes preference similarity with Japan, contrary to Alesina and Dollar's (2000) 
result, fails to affect the level of overall bilateral aid. In addition, we can show that even when 
calculating similarity measures only based on UNGA decisions deemed important by the US 
State Department (see Thacker 1999), the results reported by Alesina and Dollar (2000) fail 
to be robust. Consequently, we find very little evidence, if any, supporting the claim that 
voting in the UNGA affects aid allocation. 
 
Hence, scholars wishing to use measures of affinity and similarity should be prudent 
when relying on existing measures. The latter do not control for possible chance agreements 
and by neglecting consensus votes introduce biases in their estimates. These biases, as we 
have demonstrated in a replication study, can also have considerable substantive 
consequences. Our approach, however, does not deal directly and explicitly with the problem 
highlighted by Bailey, Strezhnev & Voeten (forthcoming), namely possible agenda effects. 
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As we noted, both  Scott’s π and Cohen’s κ, by relying on data-dependent chance-correction, 
may implicitly adjust for such effects. Bailey, Strezhnev & Voeten's (forthcoming) approach 
to solve the problem of agenda effects can, by definition, not consider consensus votes and is 
thus likely to lead to biased estimates. This may occur if resolutions that prove very important 
for estimating the ideal-point of UNGA member states are adopted by consensus or through 
unrecorded votes. Recently, Marbach (2014) has proposed an innovative way of integrating 
unrecorded votes into an empirical model that might be extended towards an IRT-model. 
Consequently, future research has to show whether further-developed IRT-models may take 
into account both agenda effects and unrecorded votes, and whether their estimates for 
similarities improve upon the measures proposed in this paper. 
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